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The Supreme Court Review. Edited by PHILIP B. KURLAND. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960. Pp. 326, $6.00; 1961, pp. 332, $6.50.
The 19th and 20th centuries have evolved two remarkable institutions,
neither of which could have been created save by tradition and history. Both
of the institutions are autocratic in theory and yet without them the orderly
transition that is necessary for a democracy to work might well go by the
boards. The two institutions are similar in many ways. They differ in that one
is formally accorded great power and yet has none. That institution is the
English Monarchy. The other institution, formally accorded little or no power,
has great power. That institution is the Supreme Court of the United States.
Because of this power difference, and because the Court's power, which
grew without being given, is limited only by self-restraint, the two institutions
are treated quite differently by purportedly serious writers. In fact, it would
not be incautious to say that more purportedly serious writers are producing
more pure humbug about the present Court than about any other institution
in the world. There are the anti-Court point of view writers whose bias and
purpose can be politely summed up only by way of euphemism. Then there
are the writers who take the Court seriously, but who either get the Court
mixed up with its members or vice versa.1 When one excludes the histories because they are not written about the present Court, and turns to what is being
written about the present Court,'not much of worth is found besides the writings of Freund, Hart, Wechlser and Bickel, an occasional law review article
and the two volumes here being reviewed.
The Supreme Court Review represents, with two minor exceptions, precisely the kind of approach that is necessary to an intelligent comprehension
of the present Court. In the first place, the collected articleb deal with the
Court, which is to say the United States Reports. In the second place, by their
very makeup, they recognize the several different functions that the Court
exercises and the different areas in which it works. Lastly, they contain some
really excellent work. The 1960 volume consists of seven articles, and the one
for 1961 contains eight. The lead-off article in the 1960 Review, written by Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., is entitled "'The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity." 2 It is a tour deforce which sets the stage for the subsequent text of
the two volumes by emphasizing "the extraordinary difficulty of [the Court's]
task."
Professor Kalven deals with an area of the law (the extent to which sex may
I In attempting to write about the Court and serve Stone, Alpheus Mason wrote about
Stone and did disservice to the Court. Even greater disservice is done by those authors who
for some reason are either anti-Black and pro-Frankfurter or vice versa, as for example the

recent "conflict" written by Mendelson. The number of such authors is as high as their
myopia, which prevents their realizing that Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Frankfurter
are equally great jurists, and they are very great indeed.
2 1960 Sup. Cr. REv. 1.
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receive special treatment under the First Amendment) that is not important
in and of itself, but which is certainly one of the most difficult. Also, it is the
only area of high comedy in which the Court performs. Professor Kalven distills out of the Roth case 3 the present two stage test of obscenity: what would
the average man say, -and is there any sort of merit or utility to the work
apart from what the average man says? As Kalven points out, this is no test
at all simply because one man's sex may not be another's. However, since the
small and ludicrous problem of pornography, which Kalven pinpoints beautifully, 4 is continually dressed in legal jargon and presented to the Court, we are
perhaps fortunate to have nothing worse than the two stage test of Roth.
Without cataloging the other six articles and authors appearing in the 1960
Reviewt, all of which are necessary reading for students of the Court, special
mention should be made of Edward L. Barrett, Jr., and his excellent piece on
the Fourth Amendment, 5 which was written prior to the decision in Mapp v.
Ohio,6 and which asks the very questions that must have brought about the
result in that case. Even more special mention must be made of Bernard D.
Meltzer who has written the best study in depth of a single decision that I have
ever read. 7 His treatment of Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago &
North Western Railway Co.,8 illustrates the case law method in the hands of a
great teacher. Also, it is worthwhile to state that Professor Meltzer has written
a paragraph 9 that should stand for some time as the way in which Mr. Justice
Black can be respectfully taken to task when he produces one of his unsatisfactory opinions.
Professor Francis A. Allen opens the 1961 Review with an illuminating
piece on the remarkable case of Mapp v. Ohio, which, as mentioned above,
seems to reach the natural result of Professor Barrett's inquiry.10 Until the
Mapp opinion was announced, the case had been thought to involve a rather
sad little bit of obscenity, but after the opinion, the case was no more concerned with that problem than Erie v. Tompkins1" was with the law of negligence. The two cases are also related in that they represent the Court at work
on the timeless problem of federalism. Professor Allen traces the origins of

United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
4 Kalven, supra note 2 at 4 n. 21.
5 Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT.
3 Roth v.

REV. 46.

6 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7 Meltzer, The Chicago & Northwestern Case: Judicial Workmanship and Collective
Bargaining, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 113.
8 262 U.S. 330 (1960).
9 Meltzer, supra note 7 at 119.
10 Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT
REV. 1.
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U.S. 64 (1938).
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Mapp from Wolf v. Colorado,12 where the Court had recognized one's constitutional right to be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures and
at the same time refused to disapprove the admission in state courts of the evidence obtained in violation of that right. Under Mapp the admission of such
evidence by a state court violates the defendant's right to due process of law
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Professor Allen's analysis of the relevant case law makes it seem clear that
no student of the Court should have been surprised by the Mapp decision.
Interestingly enough, the Mapp result appears to have surprised no one except
students of the Court, as only they had taken the time to view Wolf as a step
backward rather than a half step forward.
As suggested earlier, two of the articles are subject to some question. Both
appear in the 1961 volume. One is the article by Walter F. Murphy on Mr.
Chief Justice Taft and Supreme Court appointments. 13 The saving grace of
this article, if any there be, is that as an inside story it does not purport to be
concerned with the present Court. For that matter it is not even concerned
with the Taft Court.
The second article that should have been blue-pencilled for purposes of
uniform excellence is Alexander Meiklejohn's piece entitled "The First
Amendment is an Absolute."1 4 One wonders about the inclusion of this bit of
civilized conclusion, if only because it concerns people and political science
rather than the Court and the law. Moreover, in writing about people, i.e.
Messrs. Justice Black, Frankfurter and Harlan and Alexander Meiklejohn,
the author describes three people that do not exist. Professor Meiklejohn
starts by setting forth Mr. Justice Black's "absolutist thesis": the purpose of
the Constitution is to "withdraw from the Government all power to act in certain areas-whatever the scope of those areas may be ....,15 Nonsense. By
his own definition, Meiklejohn's absolute Justice is as relative as the next.
6
Moreover, his selection of Mr. Justice Harlan and his KonigsbergM
opinion
as an example of a Justice and an opinion that represent the school of thought
of the" 'non-absolutists,' 'balancers,' or 'operationalists' "is as free and easy
as it is inaccurate. Lastly, there is Meiklejohn's solution to his problem which
he sincerely believes is presented by the members of the Court that are not
"absolutists." He would limit the "absolute" protection accorded by the First
Amendment to thought and communication concerned with governing. Professor Meiklejohn is a great teacher of freedom, but in offering his solution
he is a student of neither the law nor the Court for he has not learned what the
12

338 U.S. 25 (1949).

13 Murphy, In His Own Image: Mr. Justice Taft and Supreme Court Appointments, 1961

Sup. CT. REv. 159.
14 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245.
15 Black, The Bill of Rights, N.Y.U.L. REV. 882, 875 (1960).
16 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
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balance of the articles in the Supreme Court Review bring home: that the case
by case approach to specific situations is the manner in which the Court works.
This is, of course, the greatness of the Court.
As noted earlier, the unlimited but self-limited lower of the Court sets it
apart not only from other courts but also from other democratic institutions.
The wonder of it is that this power has been used so as to demonstrate that
there is at least one exception to Lord Acton's much quoted maxim. While
responsible criticism of the Court is needed so that the reader may be educated
as to the form and function of the forum, the two volumes here being considered are also important for quite another reason. Stated shortly, this is so
because they contain the only sort of criticism to which the Court pays any
heed..
The Court is remarkably uninfluenced by the traditional pressures and
interests that influence (and thus defend) our other governing institutions. The
Court is, of course, influenced by its Bar in its case by case workaday, and it is
influenced in a broader sense by that very remarkable handful of men who
make up the Office of the Solicitor General. The only other source of influence is that which makes the Supreme Court Review important: responsible
criticism. Since a definition of "responsible" is in order, for want of space
let it be said that no Justice gives a fig for the Meiklejohn type of contribution
which imposes a point of view on analysis, unless of course the Justice already
agrees with the point of view, in which case he may be pleased. But the Meltzer
article is made of the stuff that changes votes. To a lawyer, this is indeed
important.
ROBERT L. RANDALL*
Member of the Washington, D.C. Bar.

